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How Earth Science Has Become a Social Science 
Naomi Oreskes ∗ 
Abstract: »Wie die Erdwissenschaften zu Sozialwissenschaften wurden«. Many 
major questions in earth science research today are not matters of the behavior 
of physical systems alone, but of the interaction of physical and social systems. 
Information and assumptions about human behavior, human institutions and in-
frastructures, and human reactions and responses, as well as consideration of so-
cial and monetary costs, play a role in climate prediction, hydrological research, 
and earthquake risk assessment. The incorporation of social factors into “physical” 
models by scientists with little or no training in the humanities or social sciences 
creates ground for concern as to how well such factors are represented, and thus 
how reliable the resulting knowledge claims might be. Yet science studies scholars 
have scarcely noticed this shift, let alone analyzed it, despite its potentially pro-
found epistemic – and potentially social – consequences. 
Keywords: Physico-social systems, hydrological modeling, climate change sce-
narios, emessions scenarios, seismology, earthquake prediction. 
1.  Introduction1 
In 2007 Paul Forman published a long, detailed, and controversial paper on the 
historical relations and valuation of science and technology (Forman 2007). 
Forman argued that while “science” – understood as the search for knowledge 
about the natural world – was a defining activity of modernity – “technology” – 
understood as utilitarian material objects and culture – has now replaced sci-
ence as the defining activity of postmodernity.2 In modernity, technology was 
subsumed under science, in postmodernity, science is subsumed under technol-
ogy. Forman argued that historians had to a great extent missed this shift, be-
cause of their own assumptions about the inter-relations and relative value of 
                                                             
∗  Naomi Oreskes, Department of the History of Science and Department of Earth and Plane-
tary Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; oreskes@fas.harvard.edu.  
1  Deep appreciation to Andrea Westermann and Christian Rohr for organizing the conference 
in which this paper was first presented, to the anonymous reviewer who helped me to clari-
fy the discussions of the IPCC, to Benedetto de Vivo for information on the L’Aquila trial 
and the ISSO position on deterministic risk assessment, and to Florin-Stefan Morar, Harvard 
University, for translations. 
2  Forman does not actually define science or technology in this paper; these are my defini-
tions, based on my reading of his implicit understanding of the distinction between these 
terms and the activities to which they plausibly refer. 
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science and technology: historians of science because they assumed the prima-
cy of science, historians of technology because they rejected it. Forman was 
particularly hard on the latter group, whose desire to elevate technology to a 
position of equity with science led them to miss a massive alteration in the 
cultural position of technology, an alteration that has given technology the 
cultural position for which they previously tendentiously argued. 
Forman’s paper has been heavily criticized, especially (and not surprisingly) 
by the historians of technology he criticizes, but it seems to me he is correct in 
an essential point: that there has been a shift in the cultural valuation of science 
and technology sometime in the relatively recent past. In this paper, I argue that 
another shift has also occurred of late, whether emblematic of post-modernity 
or not: the blurring of boundaries between the natural and social sciences, and 
the widespread incorporation of human factors into analyses of so-called “natu-
ral” systems by natural scientists. 
This pattern is particularly clear in the earth sciences (although arguably it is 
true of much research in the biological sciences as well). Many, perhaps, most, 
significant topics in earth science research today address matters that involve 
not only the functioning of physical systems, but the interaction of physical and 
social systems. Information and assumptions about human behavior, human 
institutions and infrastructures, and human reactions and responses are now 
built into various domains of earth scientific research, including hydrology, 
climate research, seismology and volcanology. In short, there has been a fun-
damental shift in how earth scientists do what they call ‘fundamental’ science. 
Historians of science have scarcely noticed this shift, let alone analyzed it, 
despite its potentially profound epistemic and social consequences. While 
many scholars have noted that the earth sciences have always had social impli-
cations, the incorporation of social parameters into earth science research – and 
the consequences of doing it poorly or wrongly – is something distinct and 
important that is only beginning to receive significant scholarly attention (Si-
vapalan, Savenije and Blöschl 2012; Lane 2014; and also Rumsey 2015; 
Uhrqvist 2015; Westermann 2015, all three in this HSR Special Issue). 
2.  Example I: Hydrological Modeling 
I begin with an example from a field that I examined some years ago in a 
slightly different context: hydrology. At that time I posed the question: How 
well do models of natural systems describe those systems? What do we learn 
when we examine model performance in hindsight? What can we learn from 
such analyses about the sources of good or bad model performance? 
In a paper published in 2001, my colleague Kenneth Belitz and I analyzed 
the performance of models that attempted to predict the behavior of hydrologi-
cal systems. Post hoc analyses of the predictive accuracy of models were at that 
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time rather scant, so our sample was small. However, for those systems for 
which we could find sufficient information to permit post hoc analysis, we 
found a striking result: that it was common for system behavior to diverge 
substantially from model predictions, and the most common cause of that di-
vergence was unanticipated changes in the forcing functions of the system 
(Oreskes and Belitz 2001). That is to say, the factors that were driving system 
behavior changed in ways that had not been anticipated, and those changes 
negatively impacted the accuracy of the model forecasts. In several cases, the 
changing factors involved human behavior and activities. 
While these models were physics-based – i.e. based on Darcy’s Law, mass 
and energy conservation, etc. – like all groundwater models they also contained 
various empirical parameters, some of which, such as groundwater pumping 
rates and artificial recharge volumes, reflect human activities. The models were 
also all calibrated against historical data. In one well-documented example in 
central Arizona, studied by hydrologist Leonard Konikow, a groundwater mod-
el that had been calibrated on the basis of 41 years of historical data – an 
amount of data that most hydrologists would consider good – failed almost as 
soon as it was implemented. 
Why did the model fail? Prior to the model construction, groundwater levels 
in the modeled regions had been falling and the model predicted that they 
would continue to fall. Indeed, the model predicted major declines in ground 
water level throughout the modeled region. Declines did occur, but they were 
generally smaller than predicted, and in some cases groundwater levels rose. 
The model assumed that prevailing trends would continue, but that did not 
turn out to be the case. The 20-year period prior to model construction was one 
of relatively uniform downward trends in water levels driven by a consistent 
upward trend in groundwater pumping. But around the time the model was 
built, pumping rates began to fall, and the model systematically under-
predicted what groundwater levels would turn out to be. 
Groundwater levels had been falling throughout the calibration period due to 
groundwater pumping and the model predicted that they would continue to do 
so, but the system changed almost as soon as the model was produced (Oreskes 
and Belitz 2001, 29; see also Konikow 1986). (In hindsight one might speculate 
that the model was built because of pressures on the system, pressures that 
were related to the changes that ensued). People began to pump less, and this 
had a major impact on groundwater levels. That is to say, human behavior was 
a driving factor in the physical response of the system. When that human be-
havior changed, the response of the system changed too. 
On examination it is obvious that the system being modeled was not simply 
a physical system but a hybrid physico-social system – a system that involved 
both physical and social driving forces. The model performed poorly because it 
failed to capture the social driving forces in that hybrid system. Of course, it is 
possible that the non-human components of the system – such as average annu-
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al rainfall – could have changed in unanticipated ways, but that is not what 
happened in this case. Changes in the human drivers most impacted the model 
performance. In hindsight it appears that if hydrologists had wished to build a 
more accurate predictive model, they would have needed to have paid more 
attention to potential changes in the social driving forces, and perhaps devel-
oped scenarios that explicitly acknowledged the potential impacts of changing 
human driving forces. Indeed, this is what some climate modelers now do. 
3.  Example II: Climate Change and Emissions Scenarios 
Anthropogenic climate change is arguably the most important earth science 
issue of social concern facing the world today, both for its potential direct 
impact on human well-being and biodiversity, and for its potentially aggravat-
ing effects on other environmental and social concerns, including poverty, 
hunger, and inequality (Dasgupta, Ramanathan and Minerath 2014). A great 
deal of scientific attention has focused on using models to understand and 
project future climate change. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the world’s lead-
ing organization addressing climate change, and, in particular, attempting to 
assess the results of future climate change. While most of the authors of the 
IPCC reports are scientists, the IPCC is not strictly speaking a scientific organ-
ization: it is a hybrid born of a scientific mother – the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) – and a political father – the United Nations Environ-
ment Program (UNEP). The founders of the IPCC recognized that climate 
change was not simply a scientific matter, but a matter of the interaction of 
human activities and responses with the climatic system. Human activities, 
such as deforestation and the addition of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, 
drive climate change, and climate change in turn has diverse impacts on human 
activities. Human responses to climate impacts may also mitigate or exacerbate 
climate change. Thus climate change as a problem simultaneously engages 
scientific, social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions, and the founders 
of the IPCC have long recognized this (Bolin 2008). 
The IPCC dealt with the intellectual complexity of climate change by creat-
ing a tripartite organizations structure, involving three “working groups” (Bolin 
2008). Working Group I assesses the “physical science basis,” working Group 
II (WG II) deals with “impacts, adaptation and vulnerability,” and Working 
Group III addresses “options for mitigating climate change,” mostly through 
analysis of “the costs and benefits of the different approaches to mitigation, 
considering also the available instruments and policy measures.” In other 
words, WG I is focused on physical science (IPCC WG I 2007, 2013), working 
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group II on social and natural science (IPCC WG II 2007, 2014), and WG III 
on policy (IPCC WG III 2007, 2014).3 
Like most divisions, this one carries implications of status and hierarchy, re-
flected not only in the designation of Working Group as number one, but also 
in the ordinal sequence in which the reports are released, with the reports of 
Working Groups I always released first, II second, and III third. Epistemologi-
cally, the results of Working Group I are described as the “physical science 
basis,” so there is an epistemic assumption built into the IPCC’s structure: that 
physical science is the foundation upon which appropriate social science and 
policy can and should be based.4 Reality, however, is more complicated than 
implied by this schema, because a key part of the IPCC assessment is the pro-
jection of future greenhouse gas emissions, which enable scientists to project 
likely or plausible future climate impacts based on expected levels of green-
house gases in the atmosphere. And these emissions projections are projections 
about people. 
In the 2007 assessment – AR4 (the most recent assessment at the time this 
paper was written) two of eleven chapters focused on such projections – one 
for global and one for regional projections.5 Portions of two other chapters (2 
                                                             
3  The IPCC Working Group I (WG I) assesses the physical scientific aspects of the climate 
system and climate change. The main topics assessed by WG I include: changes in green-
house gases and aerosols in the atmosphere; observed changes in air, land and ocean tem-
peratures, rainfall, glaciers and ice sheets, oceans and sea level; historical and paleoclimatic 
perspective on climate change; biogeochemistry, carbon cycle, gases and aerosols; satellite 
data and other data; climate models; climate projections, causes and attribution of climate 
change. Recently WG I has expanded its rubric to work with WG II on a special report on 
extreme events (IPCC 2013a) and to address questions of near-term climate change and 
predictability. 
  The IPCC Working Group II (WG II) assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural 
systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and op-
tions for adapting to it. It also takes into consideration the inter-relationship between vul-
nerability, adaptation and sustainable development. The assessed information is considered 
by sectors (water resources; ecosystems; food & forests; coastal systems; industry; human 
health) and regions (Africa; Asia; Australia and New Zealand; Europe; Latin America; North 
America; Polar Regions; Small Islands). 
  The IPCC Working Group III (WG III) assesses options for mitigating climate change through 
limiting or preventing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing activities that remove them 
from the atmosphere. The main economic sectors are taken into account, both in a near-
term and in a long-term perspective. The sectors include energy, transport, buildings, indus-
try, agriculture, forestry, waste management. The WG analyses the costs and benefits of the 
different approaches to mitigation, considering also the available instruments and policy 
measures. 
4  This epistemic assumption is so widely assumed that it is difficult for many people to as-
sume any alternative. 
5  This paper was written before the IPCC Fifth Assessment was released, in which the treat-
ment of emissions scenarios was substantially revised. These changes occurred too late for 
detailed consideration in this paper; the most important aspect for our purposes is discussed 
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and 9) also present calculations that rely to some extent on model results, 
which in turn rely on estimates or measurements of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Consider what the IPCC had to say in AR4 about the role and importance of 
these emissions scenarios: 
[E]stimates of future concentrations of LLGHGs [long-lived greenhouse gas-
es] and other radiatively active species are clearly subject to significant uncer-
tainties. The evolution of these species is governed by a variety of factors that 
are difficult to predict, including changes in population, energy use, energy 
sources and emissions. For these reasons, a range of projections of future cli-
mate change has been conducted using coupled AOGCMs [Atmosphere-
Ocean General Circulation Models]. The future concentrations of LLGHGs 
[…] are obtained from several scenarios considered representative of low, 
medium and high emission trajectories (IPCC WG I 2007, 755). 
The scientists involved recognized and acknowledged that scientific forecasts 
of climate change are based upon estimates of future concentrations of long-
lived greenhouse gases (LLGHG) and other relevant atmospheric constituents, 
and a primary control on these constituents is human activity. So while they are 
offering a report by physical scientists about physical science, they cannot do 
their job without considering certain variables whose values hinge on human 
activities. These variables include the number of people on the planet and the 
amount and type of energy that they use; the latter requires us to imagine what 
kinds of lives they are likely to live. They are matters of economics, technolo-
gy, demographics, culture; they are what we might call “future history” 
(Oreskes and Conway 2014). One cannot forecast climate change without 
forecasting the activities and lifestyles of people. So the “physical science 
basis” of the IPCC assessment has human activity at its core. It is a blend of the 
physical and the social. 
There is, of course, nothing exceptional about collaborations between scien-
tists in diverse disciplines, and it is not a criticism of the IPCC to point out that 
social scientists are actively engaged in its assessments. But it is to point out a 
gap between the manner in which the IPCC presents itself and its work – and 
presumably the manner in which the scientists themselves think about it – and 
the reality. Working Group I does not present itself as a collaboration between 
the physical and social sciences. The lead authors of the chapter on climate 
model projections are physical scientists, as are nearly all the lead authors in 
Working Group I (and this is true not just for AR4, but for earlier and later 
reports of WG I as well). These physical scientists did not produce the emis-
sions scenarios on which the AR4 climate projections were built; those were 
supplied by the vehicle of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 
developed by social scientists (IPCC WG I 2007, 749). 
                                                                                                                                
above. Readers may also wish to consider the IPCC SREX 2012, in which WG I and WG II sci-
entists collaborated to integrate the physical and social elements. 
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How did the social scientists involved develop these emissions scenarios? 
Future emissions cannot, obviously, be measured. As already noted, their val-
ues will depend on a large number of variables, including not only the size of 
future populations, but where those populations live and what kinds of lives 
they live, changes in energy efficiency, agricultural practices, patterns of defor-
estation, and many other matters. If the world responds to climate change by 
implementing policies designed to change the patterns of human behavior and 
activity, then this will in turn impact future emissions, so projections of emis-
sions and actual emissions are not independent variables. As the IPCC explains 
it:  
future emissions, even in the absence of explicit climate policies, depend very 
much on the choices people make; how economies are structured, which ener-
gy sources are preferred, and how people use available land resources (IPCC 
WG III 2000, summary on the cover; see also discussion in Moss et al. 2010; 
Manning et al. 2010). 
By their own account, IPCC social scientists dealt with this complexity – and 
the inherent problem that the future cannot be measured – by developing “nar-
rative storylines.” They attempted to quantify these “storylines” with the help 
of six different integrated models from different countries (IPCC WG III 2000, 
69-71). The scenarios developed are not predictions in a formal sense, but are 
better understood as plausible stories. Thus, what we find is that a basic input 
parameter into the complex numerical simulation models that climate scientists 
in AR4 used to construct projections of the future climate changes and their 
impacts was a story about the future. 
Strikingly, in AR5 the IPCC changed the way it handled emissions, drop-
ping the emissions scenarios and offering instead a set of “representative emis-
sions pathways (RCPs). In these RCPs, future temperature levels were linked to 
levels of radiative forcings: 2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 W/m2 by the end of the twen-
ty-first century, relative to pre-industrial levels. This, one might argue, is a less 
social formal of analysis, as it re-focuses attention on a central physical varia-
ble: the level of radiative forcing (Moss et al. 2007, 2010; IPCC 2013). At the 
same time, by placing time frames on when these levels would be reached, and 
by attempting to calculate what mix of gases and other components (CO2, CH4, 
aerosols, etc.) might produce these pathways, the social drivers remain an es-
sential component of the projections.6 
Let me reiterate: I offer this discussion neither as a criticism of the IPCC nor 
of climate modeling in general, but as a matter of record: a descriptive account 
of the ways and means in which social parameters are embedded in the “physi-
                                                             
6  The 2007 expert report, which first proposed this alternative approach, gives a detailed 
discussion of the reasoning behind this change. Its analysis is beyond the scope of this pa-
per; suffice it to say that in this discussion, one sees scientists grappling with the best way 
to handle the interactions between the physical and the social (Moss et al. 2007). 
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cal” science basis of climate modeling. The sociologist of science Steven Year-
ley has put it this way:  
the business of predicting greenhouse gas emissions, climate futures and poli-
cy responses is critically dependent on social variables such as the choice of 
technology, regional development policies, consumers’ behavior and the per-
formance of the economy (Yearley 2009, 390).  
What I am underscoring here is that this dependence is expressed not only in 
work that explicitly addresses social dimensions of climate change, but in the 
work that provides the (allegedly) physical science basis as well. As an empiri-
cal matter, we observe social questions inextricably linked to the production of 
scientific forecasts of climate change, with estimates of social parameters built 
into the foundations of those forecasts. 
4.  Example III: Seismology and Earthquake Prediction 
On 6 April 2009, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck L’Aquila, the main city of 
the Abruzzo region in central Italy, destroying thousands of historic buildings 
and killing 309 people. Three years later, in October 2012, seven men – six 
scientists and a former government official – were sentenced to six years in 
prison for involuntary manslaughter in connection with those deaths.7 
Anglophone news media reacted with outrage. Viewing the trial in the con-
text of recent attacks on climate scientists, American and British scientists saw 
the trial as yet another example of the “war on science” (Mooney 2005). Call-
ing the trial “perverse” and the sentence “ludicrous” the British journal Nature 
suggested that it revealed “contempt for science” (Nature 2012). The American 
weekly Time magazine interpreted the prosecution and conviction as further 
proof – if one were needed – that we were living in a dark age of stupidity and 
scientific illiteracy (Kluger 2012). Various commentators promoted the idea 
that scientists had been prosecuted for the crime of failing to predict the unpre-
dictable (Pappas 2012). American scientists were distressed: Both American 
Geophysical Union and the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS), issued statements in support of the Italian defendants. As 
reported in the journal Nature, the AAAS said it was “unfair and naïve” of 
local prosecutors to charge the men for failing “to alert the population of 
L’Aquila of an impending earthquake” (Nature 2012). 
But the Anglophone media representations and British and American reac-
tions were misleading. The scientists were not tried for failing to predict the 
earthquake, and one finds no evidence to suggest that this case was part of a 
                                                             
7  <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14981921>, 20 September 2011 (Accessed April 
18, 2014). 
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broader pattern of politically motivated attacks on science. The scientists were 
tried for manslaughter on the grounds that they had given “inexact, incomplete 
and contradictory” information about the risk that the town faced, particularly 
in light of the swarm of precursor events that might otherwise have led people 
to evacuate (Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012, III). By offering misleading reassur-
ances, the indictment alleged, the scientists encouraged many people who 
might otherwise have evacuated the town to stay in their homes, where they 
died when those homes collapsed. 
The case centered not on the matter of whether or not earthquakes can be 
predicted, but on political questions about the social obligations of scientists 
speaking in official advisory capacities, and epistemic questions about the 
appropriate manner in which risk assessments should be performed. The ques-
tions at stake were what information scientists should have offered the public, 
and how that information should have been communicated. They were not so 
much matters of scientific facts, but matters of how those facts were rendered 
and communicated. 
5.  Background 
Throughout the early months of 2009, L’Aquila experienced numerous small 
tremors. Among diverse public reactions to the swarm of tremors, a retired 
laboratory technician named Giampaolo Giuliani, whose career included 20 
years at the nearby Gran Sasso National Laboratory, began to make measure-
ments of radon gas levels, using home-made radon detectors throughout the 
region. On the basis of his radon measurements, Giuliani concluded that a large 
earthquake was imminent. 
Perhaps because of Guiliani’s prediction and certainly in light of the large 
number of minor quakes they had already experienced, residents of L’Aquila 
were becoming nervous. On 30 March 2009, national civil-protection officials 
cited Guiliani for procurato allarme – instigating alarm – and forbade him 
from speaking publicly about earthquake risk. The Italian government also 
asked a group of experts to assess the risk level. The National Commission for 
Forecasting and Predicting Great Risks (Commissione Nazionale per la Previ-
sione e Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi) met in L’Aquila on 31 March 2009. 
Their conclusion was that, in light of the large number of small tremors that 
had occurred, the earthquake risk was raised, but it was not possible to offer a 
detailed prediction. “It is extremely difficult to make temporal predictions on 
the evolution of seismic activity,” the commission explained, and “the simple 
observation of many small earthquakes does not constitute a precursory phe-
nomenon.” Consistent with general expert opinion on earthquake prediction, 
they noted that any specific prediction “does not have a scientific foundation” 
(Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012, IV). 
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While such meetings are normally closed to the public, this one was attend-
ed by several local government officials and other scientists. It was also ex-
tremely short: only one hour. Perhaps because of the intense public interest, 
two members of the commission, Franco Barberi from Rome University and 
Bernardo De Bernardinis, then vice-director of the Department of Civil Protec-
tion, held a press conference following the meeting. Barberi and De Bernadinis 
reassured the population, reiterating that the prior minor shocks did not presage 
a major one. Professor Barberi spoke at some length with a reporter from the 
local television.8 
Reporter: Can we predict earthquakes? 
Barberi: Here the answer is very simple, you cannot predict earthquakes, if by 
prediction you mean telling in advance where, when, [and] what energy [lev-
el] an earthquake will produce. There is no technique – there were and there 
are a thousand studies, attempts, a thousand measures – but we do not have 
yet a very sure technique, so they are not predictable. Instead what you can do 
and what is actually done is study where earthquakes occur, what characteris-
tics they have, the frequency of occurrence, what is the maximum energy and 
based on this, we can determine what is the level of seismic risk, but the tem-
poral prediction is impossible and anyone who says that he/she has the tool to 
predict the earthquakes speaks nonsense (fesseria), misrepresents things and 
creates fear in the population. 
Reporter: What is the problem with the scientist who tries to predict instead of 
reassuring? 
Barberi: If a researcher is trustworthy, and this person believes he or she has a 
tool which conforms to the ways of the scientific community, to that extent, he 
or she must publish results and subject these results to the opinion of the peers, 
must publish in specialized journals and send the data to an institutional struc-
ture of reference, for example the Civil Defense Department (Protezione Civile) 
first stating clearly on what exactly the prediction was based. This is the ABC of 
seriousness. If these things are not done, it lacks elementary seriousness. 
Reporter: What is then the risk in the L’Aquila region? 
Barberi: Well, this question is not easy to answer. This was the problem ana-
lyzed by the Commission. What we can say [...] we can actually put it only in 
statistical terms. We can say that these are what in the technical language of 
seismology are called ‘seismic swarms.’ There are many shocks close-up to 
each other in time of more or less the same magnitude and are quite frequent. 
These very rarely evolve into the most critical situations. In most cases they 
are exhausted without resulting in anything more dangerous. This, however, 
does not allow us to say that it is mathematically impossible that there will be 
a stronger shock. If we could say that we would have the ability to making 
                                                             
8 The interview at the local TV Channel ABRUZZO24ORE, 31 March 2009, is available on YouTube: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42RdAzpKMSY> (Accessed April 18, 2014). Translation by 
Florin-Stefan Morar, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University. For a transcript 
see also Tribunal di L’Aquila (2012, 90-1). 
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predictions, which, as I’ve already said, we don't actually have (Tribunale di 
L’Aquila 2012, 91). 
Barberi’s comments were scientifically correct, but they seemed to imply that 
because any prediction that was made, including Guiliani’s, was unsubstantiat-
ed, it was necessarily wrong. This was, evidently, taken by many citizens to 
imply that there was no threat. Note as well the contrast drawn by the reporter 
between prediction and reassurance. When Barberi says one cannot predict 
earthquakes, the reporter draws the inference that the alternative to prediction is 
reassurance, and Barberi does not contradict that. He thus perhaps gives the 
impression that his rejection of Guiliani’s worrisome prediction means that one 
does not need to worry. 
This interpretation would have been reinforced by the comments of De Ber-
nadinis, who spoke to reporters both before and after the meeting. His com-
ments were broadcast on Italian television, placed on YouTube, and used in the 
trial by the prosecution.9 
On television, De Bernardinis appeared self-confident and relaxed, suggest-
ing that anyone who was worried was being silly. He certainly did not appear 
to be worried. In response to more than one question on the point, he insisted 
that the seismic situation in L’Aquila was “certainly normal” and posed “no 
danger.” In fact, he went further, suggesting that the various minor shocks were 
dissipating accumulated seismic energy, and so the risk was actually less than it 
would be were they not occurring. “The scientific community continues to 
assure me that, to the contrary, it’s a favorable situation because of the contin-
uous discharge of energy.” In response to this, the journalist concludes, “So we 
should have a nice glass of wine?” De Bernardinis laughs and replies “Abso-
lutely.” Indeed, he specified which wine: Montepulciano. 
The reassurances – rather than the failure to predict the earthquake per se – 
formed the basis of the prosecution case. At the trial it was argued that had the 
commissioner not so reassured the public, many would have stayed away and 
fewer would have been killed.10 
It was also important that the accused were not simply academic research-
ers, called to task for providing erroneous, inadequate, or incomplete scientific 
information. If they had been, then their condemnation might have reasonably 
been interpreted as prosecuting scholars for what they do not know – for failing 
to predict the unpredictable. But they were members of a government-
appointed commission, whose task it was to help ensure public safety and 
understanding. 
Five of the seven were scientists serving in some form of official capacity in 
the Italian government, one was a government official, and the seventh was 
                                                             
9  Interview on 31 March 2009, also available on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=kLIMHe0NnW8> (Accessed April 18, 2014). 
10  Ibid.; see also <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpSGXYkf7_s> (Accessed April 18, 2014). 
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head of a private company developed to assess seismic risk; all had participated 
in the National Commission panel that publicly refuted claims of significant, 
imminent risk. The prosecution argument was that, as members of that National 
Commission, the scientists had an obligation not just to evaluate the risk ac-
cording to accepted scientific standards, but also to communicate the risk ade-
quately and accurately in the public sphere. While they may have done the 
former to the best of their abilities, they did not do the later. Instead, the court 
argued, they provided “incomplete, imprecise, and contradictory information” 
to a nervous public. 
The prosecutor Fabio Picuti, as reported in Nature, explained the point: 
I’m not crazy […] I know they can’t predict earthquakes. The basis of the 
charges is not that they didn’t predict the earthquake. As functionaries of the 
state, they had certain duties imposed by law: to evaluate and characterize the 
risks that were present in L’Aquila.” Part of that risk assessment, he says, 
should have included the density of the urban population and the known fra-
gility of many ancient buildings in the city centre. “They were obligated to 
evaluate the degree of risk given all these factors,” he says, “and they did not” 
(Hall 2011, 266). 
Citizens testified that had it not been for those reassurances, they would have 
taken better steps to protect themselves. One man, for example, recounted that 
as a child growing up in the region, his family had the tradition of remaining 
outside at night when a minor quake occurred. On the night of the earthquake, 
after feeling a shock, he and his wife discussed whether to go outside, but in 
light of the Commissioners’ comments decided to remain in their home. Four 
hours later, the main shock hit, the house collapsed, and his wife and daughter 
were killed (Hall 2011). 
Regardless of what one feels about the outcome, the facts of the trial makes 
clear that much of what was at stake in this case was communication. Yet sci-
entists do not often consider communication to be part of science; science 
graduate programs only very rarely incorporate communication as part of stu-
dents’ training. The general view, among scientists, is that doing science is one 
thing, communicating it is another. Yet increasingly, earth scientists have be-
come concerned about communication, holding workshops and sessions on 
communications in their national meetings. While L’Aquila may be an extreme 
example, it appears that, fairly or unfairly, scientists are being called upon to 
communicate their results, and if they do so badly, they may be called to ac-
count. Seismology in the twenty-first century, it would seem, is not just a mat-
ter of learning about earthquakes, it is also about adequately communicating 
what we have (and have not) learned. 
One may compare this to the IPCC treatment of risk communication, includ-
ing the famous “burning embers diagram,” which in the Third Assessment 
Report vividly conveyed the degree of diverse risks associated with climate 
change. Interestingly, this was removed in the Fourth report as too “incendi-
ary,” but reinstated in the Fifth, suggesting that the IPCC also struggles with 
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the correct degree of “alarm” or “reassurance” that it should convey (IPCC, 
WG II 2013, Summary for Policymakers; Smith et al. 2009; Revkin 2009a, b; 
Mahoney and Hulme 2012). While no one has accused the IPCC of being inap-
propriately reassuring, it has been argued that the general tendency of earth 
scientists to eschew dramatic claims has led them to tend to understate rather 
than overstate the risks associated with anthropogenic climate change (Brysse 
et al. 2013). 
6.  Seismic Risk Assessment  
There was also a second issue at stake at L’Aquila, one that received almost no 
media coverage in the US, but was extensively discussed by seismologists in 
Italy and elsewhere. That was the matter of the correct way to do scientific risk 
assessment. 
Risk assessment as a scientific practice has existed since at least the 1970s. 
In the United States, the Environmental Protection has undertaken risk assess-
ments since its establishment in the 1970s and has formally required them since 
the 1980s (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012). The European Union 
also now requires risk assessments (European Environment Agency 1998). Not 
surprisingly, there is a large scientific literature on how risk assessment should 
be done: in the U.S., the National Academy of Sciences has issued an official 
guide to risk assessment, known informally as the Red Book for the color of its 
cover (U.S. National Academy of Sciences 1983). First published in 1983, it 
has been updated twice since then, in 1994, and 1996. Both of these updates 
discuss incorporation of social factors, including the role of expert judgment, 
uncertainty, and communication in democratic decision-making (National 
Research Council 1994, 1996). European Union guidelines also stipulate that 
risk assessments should include considerations of values, social costs, cultural 
heritage, and other non-technical elements, and that scientists involved need to 
be mindful of the need for transparency and effective communication (Europe-
an Environment Agency 1998).11 
The existence of formal guidelines does not, however, mean that all experts 
agree on those guidelines, or on how they are used and implemented, and be-
hind the legal dispute at L’Aquila there was also a technical dispute about risk 
assessment. The prosecution alleged that the scientists involved  
did not meet the duties of risk assessment connected to their job of risk man-
agement and their duties of clear, correct, and complete communication; under 
the circumstances of the violent earthquake, they caused and can be held re-
                                                             
11  See also <http://ec.europa.eu/health/dialogue_collaboration/policy/index_en.htm (Accessed 
April 14, 2014).  
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sponsible for the deaths of [follows a list of names of the victims]” (Tribunale 
di L’Aquila 2012, IV). 
What are the duties of scientists engaged in risk assessment? Experts do not all 
agree. One group of scientists, associated with the International Seismic Safety 
Organization, supported the prosecution for reasons they articulated in a Posi-
tion Statement on Earthquake Hazard Assessment and Design Load for Public 
Safety, published on 6 August 2012, and made public via the internet (ISSO 
2012a). 
The motto of ISSO is “Be prepared for the largest unpredictable earth-
quake,” and this encapsulates their differences with conventional risk assess-
ment. The complaint involves a precautionary approach linked with the statisti-
cal problem of “long tails” – how do you calculate the risk of a low probability 
but high impact event? Most conventional risk assessment is based on the prin-
ciple of calculating a probability distribution function over a defined recurrence 
interval, and using that to calculate likelihoods of various levels of earthquakes. 
One multiplies the magnitude of the earthquake by its frequency to get the risk 
of an earthquake of that magnitude over that time period. Summing over all 
possible magnitudes produces an estimate of the total risk. Most earthquakes 
are small and do little or no damage; the rare big earthquakes do the most dam-
age and kill the most people. So the probability distribution function has a long 
tail. Calculating probabilities on the tail is difficult precisely because those 
events are so rare, particularly if the time frame of analysis is short. The events 
that matter most are the hardest to evaluate. 
The ISSO group argued that this conventional approach underestimates the 
actual threat. If you underprepare for the risk of a small quake, say magnitude 3 
or 4, little or no harm is done because small quakes hardly ever kill people. But 
if you underprepare for the risk of a major earthquake, magnitude 6, 7 or high-
er, then the damage may be enormous. So, the ISSO scientists argued, the 
conventional approach does not adequately protect people. Risk assessment 
should focus on the largest earthquake that is physically plausible, and protect 
for that. 
The ISSO thus defended the conviction and rejected the suggestion that the 
indictment was an attack on science. On the contrary, they argued that “the 
purpose of this trial was to ascertain the truth for the triumph of justice, certain-
ly not to intimidate science. […] By interpreting it as an attack on science and 
scientists, the detractors distort the reality of the facts” (ISSO 2012b, cover 
letter). What was the trial about, in their view? 
[W]e are convinced that the decision of the judge has stressed precise respon-
sibilities of the CGR members, who were accused not for not having been able 
to predict the earthquake, but for having wanted to corroborate a forecast of 
“no risk” in progress, although some of these scientists had previously pub-
lished articles in which they sustained the opposite position on the situation in 
L’Aquila. In addition, the lack of independence of judgment by the CGR, 
based on released declarations in line with the Department of Civil Defense 
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(as documented in their phone call recordings published in the website of “La 
Repubblica”), shows that the interactions between scientific community and 
the institutions in charge for preserving public safety require significant im-
provements […] [W]e believe that this process is extremely important to stim-
ulate researchers to “to apply science” in a responsible and impartial way, par-
ticularly when dealing with investigation of natural phenomena, like 
earthquakes, that are not predictable with precision and are susceptible to ex-
tremely serious consequences (ISSO 2012b, cover letter). 
In their view, scientists had succumbed to pressure to reassure the public, rather 
than basing their statements on the best scientific information, including, in some 
cases, their own earlier scientific work. How should science be done when the 
phenomena are not predictable and the stakes are high? They continued: 
We finally stress that, even if earthquakes are not predictable with precision, 
civil defense policy can be effectively oriented also by results of the most re-
cent studies in the field of both seismology and seismic engineering, taking in-
to consideration the expected maximum event that can be estimated in a “ro-
bust” way, for both the short- and long- term policy (ISSO 2012b, cover 
letter). 
The crux of the scientific point was this latter one: the idea of paying heed to 
the maximum event that could be expected, based on available information, 
what they labeled the “Maximum Credible Event” (MCE). Given that earth-
quakes cannot be predicted – a point on which all experts agree – how should 
one prepare for them? Conventional risk assessment focuses on the normal, in 
the sense of what do we normally expect, given the known (or possible) distri-
bution of earthquakes? These scientists were arguing for a different approach: 
what should we prepare for given the known worst-case event? 
The actual damage caused by an earthquake depends on the magnitude of 
the ground motion, and this is independent of how often an earthquake of that 
magnitude occurs. Therefore, if you discount the risk of large quakes on the 
grounds that they are rare, you may lead communities to underprepare for the 
large magnitude vents: 
[W]hen an earthquake of a certain magnitude occurs, it causes a specific 
ground shaking hazard that does not take into account whether the event is ra-
re or not. Therefore, ground motion hazard parameters for risk mitigation 
should not be scaled by the occurrence frequency (ISSO 2012b, cover letter). 
In place of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA), they advocated 
Deterministic Seismic Hazard Assessment (DSHA), using the notion of Maxi-
mum Credible Event to guide officials in preparation for large events with the 
potential to do great damage.  
[S]tructures should be designed and constructed to withstand the largest of 
Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) events that include or exceed [known] 
historic events [in geologically comparable situations] and the public should 
be advised to be prepared and ready for such possible events […] These are 
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the most dangerous and destructive events that can happen at any time regard-
less of their low frequencies or long recurrence intervals (ISSO 2012a, 1). 
Stressing the low frequency of major events gives the public the impression 
they need not prepare for them – and the scientists involved in L’Aquila had 
done just that.  
Although seismic hazards and the risk in L’Aquila were already known to be 
very high, the CGR came to conclude that a larger earthquake was ‘improba-
ble,’ overlooking and even in direct contradiction and scientific betrayal of 
their knowledge […]. Regardless of how long is the recurrence interval […] 
the consequences from a possible seismic event should always be considered; 
specifically (a) the largest earthquake that can be expected, (b) the strongest 
one that can be scientifically assessed, or (c) at the very least, the size of the 
strongest one that has happened in the past. 
In other words, scientists should articulate how bad it could be, and communi-
ties should prepare for the worst. “Using a long recurrence interval or low 
frequency argument as a basis for [discounting] ‘improbable’ earthquakes leads 
to a false and unjustified sense of security” (ISSO 2012a, 3). The 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake off the coast of Japan, which led to the devastating events at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plants, was a case in point. PSHA had led engineers 
to plan and design for earthquakes up to 8.5 creating tsunamis up to 5.2 meters; 
the actual event involved a magnitude 9 quake and a tsunami that in places 
reached 40 meters in height. Yet historical events suggested that such events 
had occurred in the past; if scientists had heeded that evidence and engineers 
used it, “it would definitely have helped to reduce considerably the damage” 
(ibid., 4). 
The approach advocated by the ISSO scientists would be far more protec-
tive, but it would also be far more expensive. No doubt some would argue that, 
given the realities of official budgets, it simply is not realistic. Others might ask 
how money spent on a maximum level of earthquake preparedness would bene-
fit the relevant publics as compared with funds spent on education, health care, 
or other public goods. The point here is not to say which approach is better or 
more justifiable, but simply to point out that this is a choice, one that cannot be 
made on purely technical grounds. The issues involved are inescapably linked 
to questions of cost – both the monetary cost of reinforcing buildings, evacuat-
ing towns, and caring for the injured and traumatized, as well as the non-
monetary costs of anxiety and psychic trauma associated with loss of loved 
ones and loss of cultural heritage. Once one begins to discuss the difficult 
trade-offs involved, one is moved immediately into the realms of preferences 
and value – out of the technical and into the social. 
Earthquake safety has never been simply a matter of geophysics, but most 
earthquake scientists, acting qua scientists, have traditionally understood their 
job to be to study how, when, and why earthquakes happen, and only to a lesser 
extent (if at all) how to communicate that knowledge to engineers and officials 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  262 
responsible for mitigation, or to the general public (Geschwind 2001; Clancey 
2006; Smith 2015, in this HSR Special Issue). The idea that they might be re-
sponsible – morally and legally – if people died because an earthquake was not 
predicted, or the risk not adequately communicated – strikes most Anglophone 
seismologists as startling, if not offensive; hence their outraged reaction to the 
L’Aquila prosecution. But in the contemporary world, the inter-relationship be-
tween knowledge and safety is not easily disentangled. Seismology is no longer 
simply a matter of geophysics, if it ever was. It involves consideration of ethics, 
values, and monetary and social costs. L’Aquila shows that scientists can no 
longer ignore the social factors that affect and even control how damaging a 
particular earthquake may be. Earthquake prediction is a social science.12 
7.  Does This Matter? 
I began this paper with a discussion with Paul Forman’s efforts to bring to 
historical attention developments that we historians seem not to have fully or 
properly acknowledged and addressed. That was the cultural position and per-
ceived relations of science and technology in the modern and post-modern 
worlds. In this paper, I have described a change has been taking place in the 
relations between the natural and social sciences. I have shown how social 
matters have become an essential part of the work of earth scientists in hydrol-
ogy, climate science, and seismology. In each case, the work done by people 
who identify themselves as physical scientists involves social considerations, 
and relies on information and inputs that come from the social sciences or 
socially-produced sources of information. 
My argument, put simply, is that within the world of earth science – and 
perhaps other areas of natural science as well – the relationship of the technical 
and the social has changed. Of course, social considerations have always been 
implicit in the earth sciences, concerned, as they have been, with satisfying the 
resource needs of societies for minerals, fuels, and water, and understanding 
geophysically-based natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsu-
namis. Still, for most of the history of these sciences, the social dimensions 
have been considered secondary rather than primary, “applied” rather than 
“fundamental” (Oreskes and Doel 2002). The discussion presented here sug-
gests that these social elements have now become explicit, primary, and fun-
damental. We might say that there has been a fundamental change in how sci-
entists do “fundamental” science. 
                                                             
12  Note added in proof: In November 2014, the convictions of the L’Aquila scientists were 
overturned by an Italian judge. The families of the victims have pledged to appeal. 
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This, I would suggest, is an empirical phenomenon worthy of note, and pos-
sibly significant of not just perceived changes in the inter-relationship of the 
social and the natural worlds, but actual changes in the inter-relationships of 
the social and the natural worlds. As historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, 
the world around us has changed, and the social and the natural can no longer 
be analyzed as separate realms (Chakrabarty 2009; see also Latour 1993; 
Oreskes 2007; Lane 2014). Men and women have become geological agents, 
and this means that our analyses of geological processes necessarily must in-
clude human activities. And by this, I mean “geological” in the broadest sense: 
our use of groundwater changes hydrological systems, our use of fossil fuels 
changes the climate system (and acidifies the ocean), and waste water re-
injection from shale gas drilling is now causing if not large earthquakes, then at 
least small to moderate ones (Cherry et al. 2014). 
Recognizing this requires a very large change in scientific and cultural 
thinking. As Stephen Jay Gould, Martin Rudwick, and other historians have 
argued, it was long viewed as the major accomplishment of geology, qua geol-
ogy, to have demonstrated the insignificance of human time in comparison to 
the long stretch of geological time (Gould 1987; Rudwick 1992). 
But time is one thing, impact is another. To their credit, natural scientists 
have increasingly recognized this, and have begun to incorporate social scientific 
matters into their analyses, recognizing that the world in which we live is increas-
ingly one in which the systems that concern us – in some cases gravely – are 
neither wholly social nor wholly natural, but complex composites of the social 
and the natural.13 On the other hand, the incorporation of these social factors has 
often not been fully acknowledged, nor managed in a satisfactory way. 
Another way to put this is to stress that many of the systems we are studying 
are coupled earth and social systems, in which the social components are as 
dispositive as the physical ones, but many (if not most) of our models reflect 
this only incompletely. Models may incorporate parameters reflecting social 
variables – as in the example of the hydrological models – but in a static, and 
therefore empirically inadequate, manner. Modelers may be well aware – as in 
the L’Aquila example – of the social dimensions of risk, yet these dimensions 
may nonetheless be inadequately incorporated into their risk assessments and 
communications. In the modeling of emissions scenarios, scientists have rec-
ognized that crucial social drivers will change, but the level of scientific atten-
tion to these drivers has not matched the level of attention to the physical ones. 
This, of course, reflects larger social patterns, prevalent since the Cold War, 
in which the physical sciences have in general (and with the possible exception 
of economics) been far better funded than their social counterparts. So it is not 
                                                             
13  The recent suggestion of the term ‘Anthropocene,’ to name a new geological epoch, is an 
indication of this recognition. See Rosol (2015, in this HSR Special Issue) and <http:// 
quaternary.stratigraphy.org> (Accessed December 10, 2014). 
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surprising that, while physical scientists have made tremendous strides in un-
derstanding the questions such as climate sensitivity, we have made rather less 
progress in standing crucial human drivers and dimensions of climate change. 
This matters, because in the end, the planetary impacts of climate change will 
depend both on climate sensitivity and on the levels of emissions and degrees 
of deforestation that humans produce. And no matter how well we understand 
the climate system, we will not prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
in it if we inadequately understand the anthropogenic dimension. 
We may say something comparable about hydrology and seismology. We 
know a good deal about how to protect groundwater resources, but we are 
inconsistent in implementing what we know. We know well where earthquakes 
occur, but we seem to know less well how to persuade governments and indi-
viduals to prepare adequately for them. Yet our future health, well-being, and 
prosperity may be supported or undermined by our ability to prepare for earth-
quakes, to anticipate volcanic hazards, to use our water resources sensibly, and 
to mitigate or adapt to climate change. In short, our well-being will depend on 
our ability to consider the physical and the social as parts of integrated and 
interacting systems. 
So, just as many commentators now follow Bruno Latour in talking of tech-
noscience (Latour 1987), we might begin to speak profitably about socio-
physical systems – or at least to search for a gracious term to describe such a 
phenomenon. We might even hope that as our natural scientific colleagues 
increasingly recognize that the performance of their models may depend on their 
success in capturing the social components of the systems they study, that they 
might also begin to develop a capacious – and more generous – appreciation for 
the need for social scientific study and analysis. But the blending of social and 
physical phenomena in the world of earth scientists is not simply of social or 
semantic significance. It has, I would argue, epistemic implications as well. 
One implication involves the predictability of human behavior. It is not 
news that humans are unpredictable, yet many models in the natural sciences 
implicitly assume consistency in human behavior. As our hydrology example 
shows, they follow persistence forecasting: they assume that current trends will 
continue. When the system being examined is a closed system with stable 
boundary conditions, controlled by physical and chemical laws of nature, per-
sistence forecasting may be reliable. But if history shows anything, it is surely 
that human behavior is not law-like. Human behavior does change, and often 
we would have to say that this is a good thing. But from an epistemic perspec-
tive, one would have to argue that the more models include human behavior, 
the more likely they may be to break down, particularly if the models assume 
some degree of persistence forecasting. 
Increasingly, scientists recognize that terrestrial systems are never complete-
ly closed to human effects, and the systems we are most interested in are often 
ones in which human effects – or effects on humans – loom large. When a 
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model is built in aid of decision-making, this almost by definition means there 
is a human interest, and likely a human component, in that system. Climate 
change is a problem for us largely because it will impact (and potentially over-
whelm) our infrastructure. With rare exceptions, earthquakes do not kill people, 
buildings and bridges that collapse and fall on people (because of an earth-
quake) do. Earthquake hazard arises because of the interplay between the 
earthquake and human activities – the same, to a large extent, is true of climate 
change. We are building models because there is some kind of problem, and 
therefore there is an implication that changes in human behavior might be 
needed (or at least useful). The very fact that the model is being built might be 
an indication that human activity in the future will change, in response to the 
problem that is being modeled. This means that in many cases accurate descrip-
tion of human components may be required for reliable operation of the model. 
In other words, the social scientific component matters, and if it is handled 
poorly, the knowledge claims that emerge are not likely to be robust. 
Focusing specifically on the question of climate change, sociologist Steven 
Yearley has noted that, despite the fact that social dimensions are built into the 
IPCC analysis, the overall orientation of the IPCC has been focused primarily on 
the natural scientific aspects, even though arguably the “social science side of the 
equation […] has outweighed in its implications the natural science side.” This 
matters, he notes, because “this orientation has led to a neglect of the importance 
of the ways that economic and social scientific aspects of global warming have 
entered into the business of forecasting, understanding, and trying to manage 
the changing climate” (Yearley 2009, 390). While the IPCC has clearly made 
progress on this question since 2009, the basic point remains legitimate. 
8.  Epilogue 
In a follow-up paper, recently published in Osiris, Paul Forman (2012) extend-
ed his argument to insist that postmodernity is also characterized by the break-
down of disciplinarity. Disciplines, he suggests, with their “proceduralist” 
attention to means and methods, have of late given way to various forms of 
anti-disciplinarity. The analysis presented here strongly supports this claim, as 
earth scientists have increasingly acknowledged – albeit mostly implicitly – 
that the problems that society supports them to address – water supply, climate 
change, seismic and volcanic risk – are hybrid problems, borne of the interac-
tion between human activity and natural systems. Earthquakes have always 
existed, but they became a problem for human societies when we began to 
build rigid infrastructures. Water supply has famously challenged human cul-
tures since ancient times, and the failure of some of ancient civilizations to 
manage their water supplies was a significant cause of difficulty for, if not 
actual collapse of, those civilizations. Climate change, as a natural phenome-
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non, has always existed, but climate change understood as “dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference in the [natural] climate system” is a problem borne of our 
capacity to recover and exploit the energy stored in fossil fuels, coupled with 
our seeming incapacity to reform an economic system that fails to account for 
environmental damage as an accumulating cost. 
The incorporation of social perspectives into the earth sciencea is thus al-
most certainly a good idea, and how it is being done surely a topic for further 
examination. Yet at the same time, it would be difficult to describe these trends 
as “discipline-disregarding,” as most of the practitioners involved still consider 
what they do to be earth science. The IPCC, as I have stressed, maintains an 
organizational structure that presupposes a clear separation between the physi-
cal and social sciences; seismologists still call themselves seismologists; hy-
drologists are still hydrologists. One sees only modest attempts on the part of 
earth scientific journals or societies to change their names or compass to reflect 
a broader concern with topics that fall outside traditional definitions of earth 
science.14 Rather, it seems more accurate to suggest that at least some earth 
scientists are doing social science without quite acknowledging that this is what 
they are doing, without adequate training and understanding of social phenom-
ena, and, in the worst cases, without respect for colleagues who have greater 
experience and insights into the workings of social systems. In the process, 
they may do it poorly, to the detriment of the society that they believe them-
selves to be serving. 
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